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Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ect of nancial booms and extreme asset valuations on the
relative demand for skills and the wage structure. The substantial rise in wage inequality
in the U.S. since the late 1970s has been accompanied by a major expansion of nancial
services, a series of asset bubbles, and rising relative wages and relative education in the
nancial industry. I motivate and develop a theoretical framework where nancial institu-
tions benet from nancial booms and asset bubbles. Yet the complexity and novelty of
nancial products and fundamentals surrounding bubbles favor the supremacy of skilled
individuals in exploiting these opportunities. Hence nancial booms increase opportunities
for skilled labor, contributing to the rise in overall wage inequality in the economy. Simple
extensions of the basic framework allow us to study the implications of nancial regulation
and globalization of nancial services, as well as further topics. Finally, the paper docu-
ments and compares relative wage and employment patterns in the U.S., U.K., Germany,
and France, providing suggestive evidence for the theoretical framework.
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"The measure of success attained by Wall Street, regarded as an institution of
which the proper social purpose is to direct new investment into the most protable
channels in terms of future yield, cannot be claimed as one of the outstanding tri-
umphs of laissez-faire capitalism which is not surprising, if I am right in thinking
that the best brains of Wall Street have been in fact directed towards a di¤erent
object."
John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
(1936)
1 Introduction
The substantial rise in wage inequality in the U.S. since the late 1970s documented in many
studies (e.g. Katz and Autor, 1999; Piketty and Saez, 2003) has been accompanied by a major
expansion of the nancial industry, and a series of asset bubbles including the LBO boom of
the 1980s, the dot-com bubble of the 1990s, and the recent credit and housing boom. While
the U.K. has experienced a similar surge in inequality, major Continental European economies
such as France have not (Katz and Autor, 1999; Piketty, 2007). Given the prominent role of
Wall Street and the City of London in the nancial booms of the past decades, one wonders
whether the nancial sector and asset bubbles have been contributing factors to the divergent
paths of wage inequality.
Figure 1a illustrates the strong expansion of the nancial industry in the U.S. and U.K.
over the past decades. Since the late 1970s around the time of the nancial deregulations of
Reagan and Thatcher the shares of nancial intermediation in U.S. and U.K. GDP have risen
substantially, while no such trend can be discerned in Continental European economies such as
France and Germany. And indeed, the expansion of the nancial sector has been accompanied
by a substantial rise in wage premia earned in nance compared to non-nance jobs in the
U.S. and in the U.K, while these wage gaps have been stagnating or even slightly receding in
France and Germany.1
Motivated by these patterns, the present paper takes the viewpoint that modern nancial
markets have been characterized by an ever-increasing number of new nancial structures and
recurring phases of extreme asset valuations; which resulted in high fees and increasing rents to
be earned in the nancial sector; and that these features have played an important role in the
1The nance/non-nance wage gaps are calculated using standard wage regressions including the usual
controls, see empirical section. Given the di¤erences in data sets across countries, di¤erences in levels should
not be overemphasized, and the present analysis focuses on trends.
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Figure 1: Financial sector developments (Source: a) Gross Value Added; U.S. Industry Accounts,
U.K. National Accounts, INSEE/Comptes Nationaux, Eurostat; b) Wage regressions; CPS, BHPS,
GHS, SOEF, LFS)
developments of the international wage structure. The paper develops a theory where nancial
institutions benet from deregulations and extreme asset valuations. Yet the complexity and
novelty of nancial products and fundamentals surrounding asset bubbles favor the supremacy
of certain groups of workers such as the higher-skilled in exploiting these opportunities. Hence
nancial booms increase opportunities for skilled workers in nancial services, contributing
to the rise in overall wage inequality. Simple extensions of the basic framework allow us to
study the role of nancial regulation, the consequences of globalization of nancial services,
and potential drivers of the wage gaps between nance and non-nance jobs. The second part
of the paper investigates the implications of the model using wage data of advanced OECD
countries including the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France.
The basic framework is based on a simple overlapping generations economy with three key
ingredients: First, asset bubbles may arise under certain economic conditions. Second, workers
di¤er in their skill sets (e.g. educational levels, and in an extension, in other characteristics).
Third and most importantly, deregulation and asset bubbles create rent opportunities in the
nancial sector. The savings and investment process of the economy is organized around
nancial intermediaries, which engage in traditional intermediation, collecting savings from
households and lending them to the real production sector. Traditional intermediation is
essential for the capital accumulation of the economy but can be standardized to a high degree
and consequently yields low fees. Savings can also be channeled into new nancial structures
and asset bubbles. The key assumptions is that this intermediation of bubbles generates high
fees and is relatively skill-intensive given the complex nature of new nancial products and
fundamentals surrounding asset bubbles.
The analysis shows that deregulation and the emergence of asset bubbles leads to a growing
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nancial sector, higher employment of skilled individuals in the nancial sector, and higher
wage inequality between more-skilled and less-skilled individuals. As more rent opportunities
arise for skilled individuals, the nancial sector absorbs a growing mass of skilled workers,
inating the sector, while lowering real output. The scarcity of skilled individuals in real
production drives up their marginal products and wages in the economy.
The framework is used to evaluate the impact of nancial regulation policy. It can be
shown that stricter regulation of traditional intermediation makes conditions for bubbles less
likely, but more importantly, hurts the real sector by lowering the range of capital goods
intermediated. On the other hand, stricter regulation of bubble intermediation mitigates the
negative e¤ect of rent seeking activities on real output and inequality. A simple two-country
extension of the basic model allows us to study the impact of globalization of nancial markets
and services. It can be demonstrated that the country with looser regulation evolves into
the leading nancial center, plagued by higher inequality. Furthermore, increasing returns
to scale in intermediation due to local spillovers can turn the e¤ect of initial loose regulation
persistent across time. These ndings will be important when evaluating wage and employment
data across nancially integrated countries such as within Europe. Finally, another simple
extension demonstrates how di¤erences in access to rents and in tastes generate growing wage
gaps between between nance and non-nance jobs in periods of deregulation and inating
bubbles.
The results are in line with a recent empirical study by Philippon and Reshef (2008). Using
wage and employment data for the U.S., they document that "nancial jobs were relatively skill
intensive, complex, and highly paid until the 1930s and after the 1980s, but not in the interim
period." Initial calculations of the authors revealed that the nancial sector contributed about
15-20% to the rise in overall wage inequality in the U.S., thus being an important contributing
factor.2 The model of this paper is consistent with these ndings as both episodes before the
1930s as well as after the 1980s were marked by signicant asset bubbles and light regulation.
Another recent study also nds that nancial development increases inequality, while banking
crises reduce top income shares of the rich, using a panel of 16 countries over the twentieth
century (Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenström, 2009).
The second part of the paper extends the still small empirical literature on inequality and
the nancial sector by evaluating wage and employment data of the four largest advanced
OECD countries with comparable household survey data available: the U.S., U.K., Germany,
and France. The aim is to document and compare wage and employment patterns over the
last decades, providing suggestive evidence for the theoretical framework. The U.S. and U.K.
spearheaded the global deregulation of nancial markets and services starting in the 1970s,
2Presentation at the NBER Summer Institute 2009 of Reshef
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which accelerated substantially in the 1980s under Reagan and Thatcher. Germany and France
eventually followed but at a slower pace. As a result of these and other factors, the U.S. and
U.K. could build comparative advantages in intermediation translating into higher nancial
activities than in Germany and France. Motivated by these observations, wage and employment
structures in the nancial sector are studied, contrasting the Anglo-Saxon with the Continental
European experience over the past decades. Finally, general trends in wage inequality are
compared across countries with special attention turned to the timing of deregulation and the
rise of asset bubbles.
Besides the extension of the empirical literature on inequality and nancial services, the
paper contributes to the extensive literature on the documentation and causes of the rise in
wage inequality (e.g. educational wage di¤erentials) in the U.S. Leading explanations include
directed (skill-biased) technical change (e.g. Autor, Katz, and Krueger, 1998; Acemoglu, 1998
and 2002; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001), the decline in union activity (e.g. DiNardo, Fortin,
and Lemieux, 1996; Card, 1998), and globalization/outsourcing (e.g. Feenstra and Hanson,
1996). This paper highlights the role of asset bubbles and nancial deregulation as important
contributing factors to the rise in wage inequality in the U.S. and U.K., and the divergence
from Continental Europe.
And nally, the paper is related to the theoretical literature on the impact of nancial
services on the economy. One strand of theoretical work has stressed the growth promoting
e¤ect of nancial intermediation (e.g. Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga and Smith,
1991). On the other hand, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) make the example of trading
as a rent seeking activity with negative e¤ects on growth. The present paper evaluates both
aspects of the nancial sector in a single framework: It introduces a simple yet intuitive
structure to study traditional intermediation in a macroeconomic context, modelling banks as
monopolistic competitive lenders specialized in di¤erent real sectors. And it formalizes rent-
seeking intermediation with bubbles and loose regulation as sources of rent opportunities in
the nancial sector. Independently of this work, Cahuc and Challe (2009) have developed a
similar theoretical framework studying the e¤ects of asset bubbles on occupational choice in
the presence of nancial intermediaries yielding similar results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the key assumptions and mecha-
nisms, and provides an overview of the main ndings. Section 3 introduces the theoretical
framework. It then derives and analyzes the equilibrium and conditions for bubbles. Finally,
the main results of the model are presented, studying the impact of asset bubbles on labor
markets, the role of nancial regulation, globalization of nancial services, and nance/non-
nance wage gaps. Section 4 documents and compares wage and employment patterns of the
U.S., Germany, U.K., and France, providing suggestive evidence for the theoretical framework.
5
Section 5 concludes.
2 Financial sector, bubbles, and labor markets: an overview
Financial institutions engage in nancial intermediation, around which the savings and invest-
ment process of the economy is organized. Intermediaries serve the business sector, supplying
it with capital; and they serve households, investing their savings. In an economy free of asset
bubbles and speculative excesses, nancial institutions channel the householdssavings mainly
into businesses. They identify, nance and monitor entrepreneurs, start-ups as well as mature
businesses, and then transform duration, risk and lot sizes of these investments, in order to
create suitable savings vehicles for households. This "traditional intermediation" is a crucial
element of the capital accumulation and innovation process of an economy.
By channeling savings into investments, however, nancial institutions are often substan-
tially involved in the creation and ination of speculative manias and asset bubbles, i.e. in the
"intermediation of bubbles". They trade bubbly assets on behalf of clients, create and manage
new structures and products, and expand bank credit for clients to invest in the latest trends
(see Kindleberger, 1996). Investors are willing to pay high fees in order to participate in the
latest nancial innovations and investment trends expected to generate more stable or higher
returns than traditional investments. And the proprietary trading units of banks and hedge
funds can prot from these frenzies by acting as counterparties, often both on the up- and
downside. In fact, nancial institutions have every incentive to propagate these products and
bubbles as they are able to benet handsomely. The share of the nancial sector in U.S. GDP
has risen strongly during the stock market boom of the 1920s and since the 1980s, whereas the
share collapsed during the Great Depression and WWII (see Philippon, 2008).
According to Minsky and Kindleberger, speculative booms start with a displacement such
as the widespread adoption of an invention with pervasive e¤ects, e.g. canals, railroads or the
automobile. Newer treatments of asset bubbles, such as Shiller (2000), Abreu and Brunner-
meier (2003), and Caballero, Fahri and Hammour (2006) also emphasize the importance of
productivity enhancing structural change for the emergence of bubbles. And Blanchard and
Watson (1982) argue that bubbles are more likely where fundamentals are di¢ cult to assess. In
the late 1920s, major industrial changes were under way, which made fundamentals di¢ cult to
assess and forecast, such as the shift from Ford to GM or the emergence of high-tech rms and
utilities with no dividend histories. These stocks became the favorites in the resulting stock
market boom (White, 1990). And the more recent bubbles were driven by the internet and
telecommunication boom, and subsequently by new funding and risk management techniques
such as securitizations fueling the recent credit and housing boom.
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The complex and novel nature of economic fundamentals surrounding bubbles in combina-
tion with the new structures to exploit them favors the supremacy of analytical skills in the
nancial sector. To prot from these opportunities, nancial institutions need to hire highly
educated and skilled bankers and traders, capable of creating new models and systems, struc-
turing bespoke vehicles and securities, and marketing them to clients. Moreover, the prot
opportunities in nancial intermediation in times of nancial booms attract skilled individuals
from other sectors such as research and engineering. Traditional banking services such as lend-
ing, brokerage, and underwriting of bonds and stocks of traditional companies, on the other
hand, can be much more standardized, require less skills, and generate lower fees.
Consider the recent housing and securitization boom. A myriad of structures has been
created to invest in credit and mortgages, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs),
asset-backed commercial paper conduits (ABCPs), and structured investment vehicles (SIVs).
The underlying credits were pooled and structured, and the tranches of these pools recycled
in yet further structures. Revenues of nancial institutions soared, but they had to employ
hoards of mathematicians, IT engineers and quantitative nance specialists to handle these
highly complex transactions. The bubbles also created vast prot opportunities for principal
trading units and hedge funds by taking proprietary exposures, lurring many graduates from
top universities as well as talent from other sectors into nancial services. As the Economist
put it well, "nance beguiled the bright and ambitious and put them to work in the trading
rooms of Wall Street and the City of London."3
The resulting impact of asset bubbles and nancial deregulation on the wage structure
can be best demonstrated with a simple supply and demand framework borrowed from the
literature on educational wage di¤erentials (e.g. Katz and Autor, 1999). Consider a real
production sector with a Cobb-Douglas production function,
Yt = AtUt
Ht
1 
using less-skilled labor (high school equivalent), Ut, and more-skilled labor (college equiva-
lent), Ht. At is a general productivity parameter, while  and 1    represent skill-specic
productivity parameters. Let us introduce a nancial sector that absorbs rents through the
intermediation of bubbles (Bt) according to Rt =  Bt using skilled labor.4 It will be shown in
the next section that the skill premium in this economy amounts to
log
wht
wut
= log
1   +  Bt=Yt

  log Ht
Ut
3Economist, January 24th 2009.
4 I abstract from capital and traditional intermediation for the moment. The next section will explain the
nancial sector in more details.
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Similar to skill-biased technical change in the basic framework (lowering ), bubbles drive
up the skill premium in the economy. Bubbles increase opportunities for skilled workers in
nancial intermediation which reduces skilled labor in real production, raising the marginal
product and compensation of skills in the economy. The rise in wage inequality due to bubbles
depends on the amount of rents that can be apprehended,  , which is determined by factors
such as nancial regulation and the relative advantage of a country in intermediation.
The next section introduces a model that generates a similar reduced form which allows
us to study the impact of bubbles and nancial intermediation, the role of nancial regulation
and globalization, as well as further topics, in more detail.
3 Model
3.1 Description of the model
Let me briey outline the key ingredients of the model, before proceeding to a fuller description:
OLG and bubbles: The structure follows the basic overlapping generations (OLG) models
with neoclassical production and capital accumulation. The OLG is the simplest intertemporal
general equilibrium framework that generates conditions under which rational asset bubbles
may arise (see Tirole, 1985; Santos and Woodford, 1997).5
Skilled and unskilled workers: Individuals are endowed with heterogeneous skills.
There are two groups of individuals, which are labelled "skilled" and "unskilled". Skilled
individuals should be interpreted as possessing superior analytical capabilities and/or having
enjoyed higher education (e.g. college degree or higher). Unskilled individuals have no such
special analytical abilities, and are less educated.
Financial intermediation: Channeling savings into investments requires intermediation
services of a nancial sector. Financial institutions may engage in traditional intermediation
channeling savings into businesses, nancing capital needs, and they may engage in inter-
mediation of bubbles, channeling savings into asset bubbles. As motivated in Section 2, the
technology of nancial intermediation of bubbles is assumed to be more skill-intensive than
traditional intermediation (and real production), since handling the complex and novel nature
of fundamentals surrounding bubbles requires a high analytical skill set. Whereas traditional
intermediation is essential to capital accumulation, intermediation of bubbles is not in our
framework. The latter is modelled as a pure rent-seeking activity, where skilled individuals
5 I am convinced that most bubbles contain signicant elements of irrationality. But since this paper is mostly
concerned with the impact of bubbles on labor markets - rather than the causes of bubbles - I chose the simpler
route of a rational framework.
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can join the nancial sector to apprehend rents created by asset bubbles.6
3.1.1 Endowments, preferences, and technology
The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals who live for two periods, and only
work when they are young. There are L individuals in each generation (no population growth).
Each young individual is endowed either with one unit of skilled labor or with one unit of
unskilled labor. There are uL unskilled and hL = (1  u)L skilled workers, with u 2 (0; 1).
Individuals have logarithmic utility functions in consumption,
U i(ci1;t; c
i
2;t+1) = ln(c
i
1;t) +  ln(c
i
2;t+1);
and supply their labor inelastically. Young individuals work and use their wage income to
consume and save for retirement subject to the budget constraint,
ci1;t + s
i
t  wit and ci2;t+1  sit(1 + rt+1)
The consumption good is produced by a competitive real sector, using capital and labor,
with the following (Cobb-Douglas) production function:
Yt =
Z Nt
j=0
Kt(j)
1=dj

(AtU
Y
t )
(AtH
Y
t )
1   ;
UYt and H
Y
t denote total employment of unskilled and skilled workers in the real sector, respec-
tively, and At the level of labor-augmenting, skill-neutral technology. There is a continuum of
di¤erentiated capital goods Kt(j) of mass Nt available to the real sector.  (> 1) parametrizes
the importance of using a variety of machines, whereas  parametrizes the overall importance
of capital in production. At grows exogenously at rate g,
At = A0(1 + g)
t: (1)
The nal good can be turned reversibly into capital goods with the technology kt+1(j) =
kt(j) + st(j).
Firms in the real sector rent capital and labor at market prices, maximizing prots. How-
ever, rms cannot nance themselves directly. They need to nance/lease capital goods
through nancial intermediaries.
6Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) make the example of trading in nancial markets. Trading might raise
market e¢ ciency, but the main gains come from the "transfer of wealth to the smart traders from the less
astute". Another example is the creation of nancial vehicles and structures for less sophisticated investors to
invest in the latest speculative assets such as tech or subprime.
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3.1.2 Traditional nancial intermediation
Financial intermediaries collect savings from individuals, and lend these savings to the real
production sector, nancing capital goods. The nancial sector consists of a continuum of
monopolistically competitive intermediaries with measure Nt, each specialized in a di¤erent
type of capital good j. One should think of nancial intermediaries being specialized in di¤erent
sectors, acquiring di¤erentiated expertise and relationships specic to their sectors covered.
Individuals cannot lend directly to the real sector (or search and monitoring is prohibitively
expensive), and thus turn to the nancial sector to deposit and invest their savings.
Financial intermediaries need to employ a xed amount of  1 units of unskilled labor in
each period to be able to operate, that is to build the required expertise, relationships and
infrastructure.7 Intermediaries set lease rates, rFt (j), and nance themselves at the prevailing
market rate on savings, rt, on deposits from individuals in order to maximize prots,
t(j) = Kt(j)

rFt (j)  rt
   1wut :
wut is the wage rate of unskilled labor. Demand for nancing of capital good j is driven by the
rst-order conditions in the real sector with respect to capital good j,
Kt(j) =

rFt (j)
Z Nt
j=0
Kt(j)
1=dj

= (Yt)
=(1 )
: (2)
Note that the nal good is chosen as numéraire. Financial intermediaries optimally set lease
rates according to the rst-order condition
rFt (j) = rt: (3)
 determines the pricing power of nancial intermediaries. The higher , the higher is the
spread intermediaries can charge on top of interest rates accruing to depositors.  can be
thought of as a general measure of market power in the traditional nancial sector, while 
measures productivity. The higher , the lower are entry barriers into nancial intermediation.
Prot ow for nancial intermediary j in period t thus amounts to
t(j) = Kt(j) [   1] rt    1wut = 0; (4)
which must be zero in equilibrium given free entry into nancial intermediation and the as-
sumption that the range of capital goods is su¢ ciently large such that each intermediary can
specialize in a di¤erent sector.
7The use of unskilled labor reects the fact that traditional intermediation can be more standardized than
intermediation of bubbles. This simplifying assumption is rather innocuous, and the main results continue to
hold if traditional intermediation needs both skilled and unskilled labor.
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In each period, intermediaries must decide whether to operate (and incur the xed costs of
employing  1 units of unskilled labor) and, if they operate, must select a sector. Since xed
costs must be incurred in every period, intermediariesentry decisions a¤ect only the current
period. Note the analogy of nancial intermediaries to capital good monopolists with xed
costs, which generates a simple yet intuitive structure to model the traditional nancial sector.
Banks face high xed costs to build infrastructure, expertise and relationships, which are to a
large extend specic to sectors. Once these investments are made, marginal costs of increasing
lending volumes are comparatively small. As a result, banks specialize in certain sectors and
products in line with empirical observations.8
Finally note that the presence of a traditional nancial sector and whether it is competitive
or not is not crucial for our key results that asset bubbles and nancial deregulation increase
wage inequality in the economy. Nevertheless, it allows a more comprehensive view of the
nancial sector and nancial regulation.
3.1.3 Bubbles and nancial intermediation
Asset prices might deviate from market fundamentals in an OLG economy (see Tirole, 1985).
Even in a rational, perfect foresight equilibrium, deviations from fundamentals can persist
under certain economic conditions. I denote the sum of this aggregate deviations by Bt, the
aggregate bubble. As motivated in Section 2, the complex and novel nature of fundamentals
surrounding bubbles creates ample room for uncertainties and discrepancies in valuations.
Hence, suppose that capital good sectors in our economy that are more complex, are more
susceptible to bubbles than traditional sectors. (Although technological progress is exogenous
in our economy, one can imagine that in an economy with an expanding variety of capital goods,
the newer sectors are less understood and thus tend to be the sectors with larger valuation
discrepancies, e.g. the internet sector.) The aggregate bubble in the economy consists of the
valuation discrepancies across sectors,
Bt =
Z Nt
j=0
Bt(j)dj:
One can think of these bubbles as paper assets attached to a given capital good sector j, which
are intrinsically worthless, but valued positively due to sustainable expectations of future
growth in value.9
8 In the presence of risk, banks optimally operate in several sectors (potentially overlapping with other banks),
trading o¤ additional diversication benets with additional xed costs of operating in further sectors.
9Note that strictly speaking the model is silent about the composition of individual bubbles across sectors,
as the composition initially is exogenous, and subsequently indeterminate. There can be random transfers of
a bubble from one asset to another over time ("bubble substitution") since individuals can perfectly insure by
holding the representative portfolio (see Tirole, 1985).
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The complex nature of bubbles favors the supremacy of skilled individuals in exploiting
opportunities around such distortions. Skilled workers can collect rents from bubbles according
to the following technology:
Rit =
 Bt
HFt
; (5)
where  is an exogenous fraction of the bubble that can be absorbed by skilled workers each
period, and HFt denotes total skilled labor engaged in nancial intermediation of bubbles.
The larger the bubbles, the more rent opportunities are available to skilled individuals. The
more skilled individuals are already engaged in bubble intermediation, however, the less each
individual earns. A skilled worker can collect a share of the total rent proportional to its relative
e¤ort, 1=HFt . Intermediation of bubbles is attractive if rent opportunities exceed opportunity
costs of wht from being employed in the real sector. Bubbles are always intermediated in the
case of  > 0, since a skilled worker could apprehend the entire rent with an arbitrarily small
e¤ort if bubbles were not yet intermediated.
The simple rent-seeking technology with an exogenous fraction  of bubbles that can be ab-
sorbed reects the observed fee structure in the nancial sector. Transaction and management
fees of banks and hedge funds are often xed percentages on loan and asset volumes, especially
in the more innovative, less competitive segments. Hence banks benet from inating asset
valuations in the economy. Finally, aggregate bubbles are exogenous and deterministic in the
basic framework. Appendix B outlines an extension with stochastic bubbles that may burst
and a technology with which skilled individuals are able to create new bubbles.
3.1.4 Savings, investments, and labor markets
Logarithmic utility in the OLG model gives rise to the familiar aggregate savings function,
St =

1 + 
h
uwut + (1  u)wht
i
L: (6)
These savings are deposited at nancial intermediaries, which channel them into investments,
It =
Z Nt
j=0
Kt+1(j)dj +Bt; (7)
that is capital for the real sector and bubbles. Individuals are willing to invest in both types
of investments if they yield the same return net of intermediation fees,
(1   )Bt+1=Bt = 1 + rt+1: (8)
Since bubbles do not pay any dividends, the aggregate bubble must grow at the rate of interest
net of intermediation fees,  .
Finally, aggregate supply of unskilled and skilled labor is equal to uL and hL = (1  
u)L, respectively, as individuals inelastically supply one unit of labor. Aggregate demand for
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unskilled labor is the sum of market demands to produce consumption goods (UYt ) and provide
nancial intermediation for capital goods (UFt ). Aggregate demand for skilled labor is the sum
of market demands to produce consumption goods (HYt ) and to capture rents by providing
intermediation for bubbles (HFt ). Labor market clearing requires
uL = UYt + U
F
t = U
Y
t + 
 1Nt; (9)
(1  u)L = HYt +HFt :
Wages are determined by marginal products in real production,
wut = (U
Y
t )
 1Yt = (uL   1Nt) 1Yt; (10)
wht = (H
Y
t )
 1 (1    )Yt:
3.2 Solution of the model
We are now ready to study the decentralized equilibrium of the economy described in the
previous section, summarized by the following denition:
Denition 1 An equilibrium in our economy is a sequence of prices and allocations such that
(a) individuals maximize utility given asset holdings of the initial old generation at time
t = 0 of [K0(j)]
Nt
j=0 and B0, and taking the time path of rt, Bt, w
u
t and w
h
t as given,
(b) real sector maximizes prots taking the time path of [rFt (j)]
Nt
j=0, w
u
t and w
h
t as given,
(c) nancial intermediaries choose rFt (j) and Kt(j) to maximize prots taking the time
path of rt and wut as given,
(d) the evolution of the range of nancial intermediaries, Nt, is determined by free entry,
(e) skilled individuals decide whether to engage in intermediation of bubbles to maximize
labor income taking the time path of wht as given,
(f) the aggregate bubble evolves arbitrage-freely according to equation (8), and
(g) factor prices, rt, wut and w
h
t , are such that all markets clear.
Let us start with characterizing the equilibrium without bubbles, Bt = 0, before proceeding
to the equilibrium with bubbles, Bt > 0.
3.2.1 Equilibrium without bubbles
The range of intermediated capital goods, Nt, is determined by free entry. Due to symmetry,
all nancial intermediaries set the same rental rates, rFt (j) = r
F
t , and the real sector thus rents
the same quantity of each capital good, Kt(j) = Kt. The free entry condition for nancial
intermediation (equation 4) becomes
 [   1] rtKt = wut :
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We can combine this condition with the lease rate setting rule, the demand for capital goods,
and wages (equations 2, 3 and 10) to obtain
Nt =
(   1)uL
 + (   1)  N; (11)
which is constant over time. As the share accruing to capital grows at the same rate as
wages (given Cobb-Douglas technology), the revenue base and xed operating costs of nancial
intermediaries grow at the same rate for a given N . Thus N does not need to adjust to keep the
free entry condition fulllled. N is increasing in the price setting power () and productivity
() of traditional intermediation.
Next, real production technology can be simplied to
Yt = (N
Kt)
(AtU
Y
t )
(AtH
Y
t )
1   = AtL(N kt)(uYt )
(hYt )
1   ; (12)
where kt  A 1t L 1Kt, uYt  L 1UYt and hYt  L 1HYt . Setting savings equal to investments
(equations 6 and 7, setting Bt = 0 for all j) yields the fundamental law of motion of our OLG
economy with a nancial sector but without bubbles:
N(1 + g)kt+1 =

1 + 

u
u  (L) 1N + (1    )

yt
with
yt = (N
kt)
(u  (L) 1N)(1  u)1   :
Note that without a nancial sector (by setting N = 1,  = 1, and  = 1) our economy
collapses to the familiar canonical OLG equilibrium with Cobb-Douglas technology and loga-
rithmic preferences. For a given N , the nancial sector reduces real production as resources
are needed in intermediation. On the other hand, it increases the labor share in income, as
part of the capital income ows into wages to compensate intermediation services of the young.
The steady state with kt+1 = kt = k is determined by:
k =
0@
h
u=(u  (L) 1N) + (1    )
i
N(u  (L) 1N)(1  u)1  
(1 + ) (1 + g)N
1A1=(1 ) :
An increase in the price setting power of the nancial sector () increases the variety of capital
goods intermediated (N), which raises real output and the savings rate for a given level of
capital.10 However, it may lower capital in the long run, k. Computations have revealed both
cases where k either decreases or increases as a result, depending on parameter values. Even if
k decreases, computations have never produced a case where long run output, y, su¤ers from
a rise in . Raising productivity of the nancial sector () has similar e¤ects as a rise in .
10Output per e¢ ciency units is increasing in the variety of capital/intermediaries, @yt=@N =
yt [=N   =(uL N)] > 0, cf. equation (11).
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Variety of capital goods and output both increase, whereas the savings rate is lowered, for given
kt. Computations never revealed cases where savings for a given kt decrease as a result. To
sum up, strengthening the traditional nancial sector (by increasing  and/or ) is benecial
for real output and wages, through the positive e¤ect of raising the variety of intermediated
capital goods. The e¤ect on aggregate capital income accruing to the old, y=, on the other
hand, depends on whether the positive e¤ect of the output expansion outweighs the negative
e¤ect of higher markups. Computations have revealed both cases.
Finally, consider the e¤ect on interest rates accruing to depositors in the steady state,
r =
rF

=
y
Nk
;
which is equal to the marginal product of capital goods less the markup for intermediation.
While the marginal product of capital may rise or fall due to increasing , the net interest
rate, r, falls in all computations. Like in the standard OLG model, the marginal product of
capital is an important element of the economic conditions under which bubbles may arise. Not
surprisingly, nancial intermediation plays an important role, too, in shaping these conditions.
3.2.2 Equilibrium with bubbles
Individuals are willing to invest in bubbles as well as productive capital if both assets yield the
same return net of intermediation costs, see equation (8). Hence, bubbles must grow according
to
Bt+1
Bt
=
1 + rt+1
1   =
1 + rFt+1=
1   ;
as bubbles do not pay out any dividends, and nancial intermediation rents ( ) must be
covered. However, if bubbles grew faster than the economy in the long run, they could not
arise in the rst place because bubbles which outgrow the economy are not sustainable. Thus
bubbles can only arise if their growth rate is (equal to or) lower than the growth rate of the
economy in the long run, limt!1Bt+1=Bt  1 + g. Similar to the canonical OLG model
without nancial intermediation, bubbles can only arise if marginal productivity of capital
(rF ) is su¢ ciently low:11
1 + rF = < (1   )(1 + g) (13)
In contrast to the canonical model, however, the marginal product must not be lower than the
growth rate if pricing power in traditional intermediation is su¢ ciently high. On the other
hand, a marginal product lower than economic growth does not necessarily generate conditions
11Starting in the bubbleless steady-state, k, bubbles crowd out part of the capital, increasing the return on
capital, rt+1 > rF . Hence, bubbles can only arise if the marginal product of capital in the bubbleless steady-state
is su¢ ciently low.
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for bubbles if rents in intermediation of bubbles are su¢ ciently high. Since  lowers net interest
rates, bubbles are more likely to arise if market power in traditional intermediation is high.
On the other hand, bubbles are less likely to arise if rents in intermediation of bubbles are
too high. See Appendix A for more details on welfare, dynamic e¢ ciency, and conditions for
bubbles.
In an equilibrium with bubbles, it is always attractive for skilled individuals to apprehend
rents (see equation 5), hence wages in the real sector must reect this opportunity,
wht = (H
F
t )
 1 Bt:
Jointly with marginal productivity in the real sector and labor market clearing (equations
9 and 10), this condition determines relative employment of skilled in the real and nancial
sector, respectively:
hYt =
(1  u) (1    ) yt
 bt + (1    ) yt and h
F
t = 1  u  hYt ; (14)
where bt  A 1t L 1Bt. The capital accumulation equation in the presence of bubbles thus
becomes:
N(1 + g)kt+1 + bt =

1 + 

u
u  (L) 1N +
 bt
yt
+ (1    )

yt
with
yt =

N kt

u  N
L
 (1  u) (1    ) yt
 bt + (1    ) yt
1  
:
The accumulation equation is similar to the one above, except that now the aggregate bubble
absorbs part of the savings, lowers real output as resources are redeployed in intermediation
of bubbles, and drives up wages of skilled workers, increasing the savings rate.
The accumulation equation jointly with the no-arbitrage condition, equation (8),
(1   ) (1 + g)bt+1 =

1 +
yt+1
Nkt+1

bt;
describe the dynamic system of the economy with bubbles. The equilibrium can best be
illustrated with a phase diagram borrowed from Tirole (1985) and Weil (1987), see Figure 2.
There is an "asymptotically bubbly equilibrium" where the bubble grows at the same rate as the
economy in the long run, and thus the bubble per e¢ ciency units converges to b^ and capital
to k^. If the bubble starts below this asymptotically bubbly path, the economy eventually
converges to the "asymptotically bubbleless" steady state, which corresponds to the steady
state from above, with k and b = 0. Since in that case the capital stock remains relatively
high with bubbles absorbing relatively little savings, interest rates remain comparatively low,
and thus the bubble grows relatively slowly, and ultimately becomes marginal compared to the
economy. Bubbles cannot start above the asymptotically bubbly path, as they would end up
outgrowing the economy, leading to negative capital.
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Figure 2: BubblyEquilibrium
Computations have revealed that increasing pricing power () or productivity () in the
traditional nancial sector shifts both the bt+1 = bt- and kt+1 = kt-locus up, creating more
"room" for bubbles. Whereas increasing rents in intermediation of bubbles ( ) shifts the loci
down, restricting the size of bubbles. Nevertheless, aggregate rents ( bt) in the asymptotically
bubbly steady state increase in  .
3.3 Interpretation of the model
Let us proceed to the content of the model. The impact of asset bubbles on labor markets in
our economy can be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Given the described economy, asset bubbles (bt) increase opportunities for
skilled workers in the nancial sector (hFt ), leading to a rise in wage inequality in the economy
as relative wages of skilled workers (wht =w
u
t ) are pushed up.
The relative wages of skilled workers can be readily calculated (using equations 10 and 14),
wht
wut
=
(u  (L) 1N) ( bt=yt + (1    ))
(1  u) : (15)
Demand for skilled workers in nancial services is given by
hFt = 1  u 
(1  u) (1    ) yt
 bt + (1    ) yt : (16)
It is straightforward to verify the proposition.
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Note that taking logs of the relative wages generates a very similar reduced form as the
one shown in Section 2:
log
wht
wut
= log

 + [   1] + log
(1    ) +  bt=yt

  log 1  u
u
;
using equations (11) and (15). The more skilled workers the nancial sector absorbs relative to
unskilled workers, the lower is the relative ratio of skilled workers in the real sector (hYt =u
Y
t ),
and thus the higher their relative marginal products and wages. Bubbles create rent oppor-
tunities in the nancial sector, attracting skilled individuals, which increases their wages and
employment in the nancial sector, while wages and employment of unskilled workers remain
less a¤ected.
3.3.1 The role of nancial regulation
Financial regulation subjects nancial institutions to certain requirements and restrictions,
shaping the opportunity set in which the nancial sector operates. Financial regulation thus
has important implications for our results.
Let us view nancial regulation policy in our framework as a triplet (G; G;  G). One
can think of a (governmental) organization that can a¤ect the parameters of nancial inter-
mediation, and thus set (; ;  ) = (G; G;  G) within certain boundaries. For example, the
organization could stimulate competition in the nancial sector, lowering the market power of
traditional intermediation, . It could increase reporting and risk management requirements,
lowering productivity in traditional intermediation, . Or it could impose restrictions on
leverage and nancial structures, lowering rent opportunities around bubbles,  . The e¤ect of
stricter nancial regulation directly follows from our discussion of the solution and proposition
above:
Corollary 1 Traditional intermediation: Tightening nancial regulation by decreasing G and
G lowers the likelihood of conditions and maximum size of bubbles.
Intermediation of bubbles: Tightening nancial regulation by decreasing  G reduces wage
inequality in the presence of bubbles.
Traditional intermediation is important for the proliferation of a broad variety of innova-
tions. Weakening traditional intermediation decreases the range of intermediated capital goods
that are available to the real sector, lowering real output. As a consequence, net interest rates
increase and savings decrease, lowering the likelihood of conditions and maximum size of bub-
bles, however at the cost of lower real production. Loosely speaking, the "price" of innovation,
partially enabled by nancial intermediation, is increased complexity in fundamentals, favoring
the emergence of bubbles. Restricting traditional intermediation lowers innovation and capital
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in the economy, and thus complexity and the likelihood of bubbles. The disadvantages of too
strict a regulation, that is of less innovation and capital, however, clearly outweigh the benets
of less bubbles.
Restrictive regulation of intermediation of bubbles reduces wage inequality in a bubbly
economy. Since rent seeking absorbs skilled workers, redistributing income and reducing real
output without creating any social benet, restrictive regulation of these activities is certainly
more appropriate. In the real world the distinction between fundamental intermediation and
rent seeking activities unfortunately is often not that easy. Regulators thus face the di¢ cult
task to nd the delicate balance between curbing excesses while not choking o¤ an important
engine of the economy.
3.3.2 Globalization of nancial markets and services
Consider a simple two-country extension of our model, with the two countries home and abroad
(marked with an asterisk). Let us assume perfect capital (and bubble) mobility, no trading
costs for consumption goods and nancial intermediation services, and immobile labor markets.
The two countries are identical, except that the nancial sector abroad has an advantage in
capturing rents of bubbles:
Rt =
a
aHFt + a
HFt
 (Bt +B

t ) and R

t =
a
aHFt + a
HFt
 (Bt +B

t ) ;
with a > a. The advantage in intermediation of bubbles translates into higher wage inequality
abroad:
Corollary 2 Given the described two-country set-up, the country with an advantage in cap-
turing rents from intermediation of bubbles experiences a steeper rise in wage inequality and
nancial sector employment of skilled workers if bubbles arise in any of the two countries.
The di¤erence in wages of skilled workers between abroad and home is driven by the
advantage of abroad in capturing rents of bubbles:
wht =
a
aHFt + a
HFt
 (Bt +B

t ) > w
h
t 
a
aHFt + a
HFt
 (Bt +B

t ) :
If a is su¢ ciently low compared to a, employment of skilled workers in intermediation at
home is zero, HFt = 0. Since wages of skilled workers are higher abroad, employment of skilled
workers in intermediation is higher and in real production lower than at home. Thus wages of
unskilled workers abroad tend to be lower as well. However, lower wages create an advantage for
traditional intermediation abroad, partially or fully keeping up wages for unskilled at the levels
of home.12 Hence, the country with the advantage in intermediation of bubbles, experiences
12Wages of unskilled workers abroad are equal or smaller than wages at home, wut =
(Kt(j) +K

t (j)) [   1] rt=  wut , with = if UKt > 0.
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higher wage inequality and a larger nancial sector if bubbles arise. Consequently, the other
country has a larger real sector (with more labor and capital).
The advantage of a country in intermediation of bubbles may be driven by its (less strict)
nancial regulation policy, or by increasing returns to scale (IRS) due to local spillovers in
intermediation of bubbles:
a = a(HFt ) and a
 = a(HFt ); with a
0() > 0:
Traders and bankers clearly benet from the proximity to each other because of (in-)formal
networks, multitude of outside opportunities, vicinity to market action and sentiment, and
other factors. For example, the majority of large European investment banks have centralized
their more complex trading, structuring, advisory, and originating activities in London.
In the case of IRS, multiple equilibria arise, and thus history and expectations help de-
termining nal outcomes. The country with a head start in intermediation (or the country
expected to become a nancial center) ends up being the predominant nancial center of a
region. The set of nancial regulation policy in the critical stage of nancial development is
decisive in this case. For London and New York most certainly both regulation and increasing
returns play an important role in their dominance as nancial centers which will be discussed
in the empirical section in more detail.
3.3.3 On the nance/nonnance wage gap
Finally, the empirical evidence presented in the introduction (also see next section) indicates
that individuals with similar levels of education, experience, and other relevant characteristics
seem to earn a signicant premium by working in the nancial sector as opposed to non-
nancial sectors in the last decades, and that this premium has increased in the past years.
How can we account for such a wage gap in our framework?
With the total rent being shared among nanciers participating in intermediation of bub-
bles, insiders already engaged in intermediation have an incentive to protect their rents from
new entrants. Alternatively, certain nanciers have better access to such rents through (family)
relationships, networks, and other dispositions. As a consequence, the ability to capture rents
varies across skilled individuals,
Rit =
(i)R L
k=I (k)dk
 Bt with (i)  (j) for i > j; and (I)R L
k=I (k)dk
 Bt = w
h
t :
I determines a cuto¤ below which skilled individuals do not participate in rent seeking. The
higher (i), the higher is the share of the rent a person i  I is allocated due to better access.
Hence during a nancial boom the wage gap between the average skilled individual working in
nance and a skilled individual working in non-nance widens.
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One could think of further labor market frictions and (potentially unobserved) hetero-
geneities that would lead to rising nance/non-nance wage gaps in times of booming nancial
markets.
3.3.4 Summary of results and empirical implications
In preparation for the empirical investigation, let us briey summarize the main results of
our theoretical framework: First, the global opportunity set for skilled individuals in nancial
intermediation is driven by the interaction of asset bubbles and nancial regulation. The
emergence of asset bubbles increases wage inequality and nancial sector employment of skilled
labor, and the rise is reinforced by nancial deregulation (i.e. looser regulation).
Second, in an environment of asset bubbles and loose nancial regulation, countries with
a comparative advantage in nancial intermediation experience a steeper rise in inequality
and nancial sector employment of skills. The comparative advantage may result from looser
nancial regulation relative to other countries, increasing returns due to local spillovers in
intermediation, and other factors favorable to nancial institutions.
Third, wages in nance may decouple from wages in other sectors. If insiders are able
to protect rents in nancial intermediation from outsiders, if tastes in careers di¤er across
individuals, or if other frictions slow down adjustments across sectors, bubbles and deregulation
may create and inate a wage gap between nance and non-nance.
Lastly, our framework has been silent about the causes of bubbles. A natural extension
would introduce the possibility for skilled individuals to create bubbles.13 In an economy
characterized by high savings and low interest rates, there is a high demand for new investment
opportunities. Smart individuals might exploit this demand by creating bubbles, such as the
latest internet start-up or CDO squared, especially if opportunities and wages in the "real
economy" are not su¢ ciently attractive. In such an environment, one asset bubble might
chase the next, keeping wage inequality at elevated levels. Deregulation and low real investment
opportunities could trigger such a cycle of bubbles and high inequality. Appendix B outlines
such an extension.
13Strictly speaking, skilled individuals have the capability to persuade other individuals that their intrinsically
worthless assets have positive values by spending time and e¤ort in developing a persuasive story around the
value of their (paper) assets.
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4 International evidence
This section evaluates wage and employment data of the four largest advanced OECD countries
with comparable household survey data available: the U.S., Germany, U.K., and France.14 The
aim is to document and compare the development of wage and employment structures over the
past decades, providing suggestive evidence for the theoretical framework discussed above.
The U.S. and U.K. spearheaded the global deregulation of nancial markets and services
starting in the 1970s, which accelerated substantially in the 1980s under Reagan and Thatcher.
Germany and France eventually followed but at a slower pace. As a result of these and other
factors, the U.S. and U.K. could build large comparative advantages in intermediation trans-
lating into higher nancial activities than in Germany and France. Motivated by these obser-
vations, wage and employment structures in the nancial sector are studied next, contrasting
the Anglo-Saxon with the Continental European experience over the past decades. Finally,
general trends in wage inequality are compared across countries with special attention turned
to the timing of deregulation and the rise of asset bubbles.
The wage and employment data comes from a variety of surveys such as the U.S. Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS), the U.K. General Household Survey / British Household Panel
Survey (GHS/BHPS), the French Labor Force Survey (LFS; enquête emploi), and the Ger-
man Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Trends in wage inequality are studied using simple wage
regressions with the usual controls as well as dummies and interactions for the nancial sector.
4.1 A brief history of nancial regulation and nancial centers
According to our framework, the demand and rent opportunities for skilled individuals in nan-
cial intermediation are determined by the size of (global) bubbles, as well as by the countrys
nancial regulation and comparative advantage in intermediation. The comparative advan-
tage, in turn, is shaped by the stringency of regulation relative to other countries, by history
given increasing returns to scale in nancial intermediation, and by other factors favorable to
nancial institutions.
The global deregulation of nancial markets and services of the past three decades was led
by the U.S. and U.K., initiated in the 1970s with the end of Bretton Woods.15 Deregulation
gained momentum in the 1980s under Reagan and Thatcher. As a consequence of oating
currencies, capital controls were abandoned by the U.S. and U.K. Reagan signed the Garn-
St. Germain Depository Institutions Act in 1982, deregulating the Savings and Loan (S&L)
14For Japan, only aggregated household survey data is available (Japanese Basic Survey of Wage Structure,
BSWS) and thus needs to be analyzed di¤erently.
15Economist, Oct 16th 2008. In 1971, Nixon suspended the dollars convertibility into gold, and in 1979
exchange controls were stopped in the U.K.
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Figure 3: Change in the index of overall restrictions on bank activites from 1998-2007 (Survey;
Barth et al. 2008)
industry in the U.S., which contributed to the subsequent S&L crisis, and sawed some of the
seeds for the recent housing boom (e.g. allowed adjustable rate mortgages). Starting in the
1980s, the Glass-Steagall Act which separated commercial and investment banking in the U.S.
was gradually dismantled and nally repealed in 1999. The U.K. followed suit with the "Big
Bang" deregulation of Thatcher in 1986 (Stock Exchange Agreement and Financial Services
Act), which among other changes allowed foreign nancial rms into the market, and ignited
the rise of proprietary trading.16 Continental Europe eventually followed but at a slower
pace. For example in the highly fragmented German banking market, state guarantees of
the public-sector banks (Sparkassen and Landesbanken) were only abrogated as recently as in
2005 upon pressure of private-sector banks. And a recent study by Barth, Caprio and Levine
(2008) indicates that Germany and France have rather increased restrictions on bank activities
relative to the U.S. and U.K. over the past ten years, see Figure 3.
History and increasing returns to scale due to local spillovers are other important drivers
of the comparative advantages of the U.S. and U.K. in nancial intermediation. The origins of
New York as nancial hub for the American market can be traced to the 18th century when
traders started gathering under a buttonwood tree on Wall Street, laying the foundations of
the New York Stock exchange. The history of London as nancial center goes back to the 17th
century with the foundation of the Bank of England, and the Napoleonic Wars during which the
nancial center of Europe moved from Amsterdam to London (e.g. Buchinsky and Polak, 1993).
The head start of Wall Street and the City of London translated into persistent advantages due
to a critical amassment of nancial activity. As discussed above, traders and bankers benet
from proximity to each other due to (in-)formal networks, multitude of outside opportunities,
and vicinity to market action and sentiment. Futhermore, the two cities o¤er other advantages
to nancial rms such as a multitude of international air links, telecommunications networks,
English as o¢ cial language, robust nancial exchanges, and deep and multinational talent
16See Economist, Sep 13th 2007 and Oct 16th 2008 for more details
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Figure 4: Share of nancial intermediation in GDP (Gross Value Added; U.S. Industry Accounts,
U.K. National Accounts, INSEE/Comptes Nationaux, Eurostat)
pools.17 A recent survey of senior nancial services professionals on the competitiveness of
nancial centers ranked London and New York City clearly ahead of Frankfurt and Paris.18
The advantages of the U.S. and U.K. in nancial intermediation manifest themselves in the
relative levels of nancial activity. As shown in Figure 4, the share of nancial intermediation
in GDP is substantially larger in the Anglo-Saxon economies than in Germany and France,
and has widened over the past decades. The share in the U.S. has doubled since the mid
1970s, while the share in the U.K. spurted in the 1980s under Thatchers Big Bang, retraced
thereafter, and started growing again substantially after 2000. The development in France and
Germany has been comparatively at.
Figure 5 shows net exports of nancial services in the past decades. Net exports in the U.K.
have been consistently positive and increasing over time, as nancial institutions have served
the European market out of London (Germany and France being the most important importers
in Europe).19 The trade balance of the U.S. in nancial services has been uctuating around
zero as New York has focused on the domestic market, exporting nancial services mainly to
other U.S. states.
Given these observations, skilled workers should have experienced a larger expansion of their
opportunity set in nancial intermediation in the U.S. and U.K. than in Germany and France
in periods of growing asset bubbles. And the (global) opportunity set should have received
a critical boost during the Reagan and Thatcher era. Let us now turn to the labor market
data, documenting and contrasting the developments in the U.S. and U.K. with Germany and
France.
17Economist, Sep 13th 2007
18"The Competitive Position of London as a Global Financial Centre", Corporation of London, 2005. The
most important competitive factors are availability of skilled personnel, regulatory environment, and access to
international nancial markets.
19"UK Financial Sector Net Exports 2008", IFSL Research (IMF data)
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4.2 Wage and employment structure in the nancial sector
Figure 6 plots the (log of the) relative wage of workers employed in nancial intermediation to
workers employed in other sectors over time.20 In the U.S., the nance/non-nance wage gap
started to increase substantially in the 1980s, around the time of the deregulation initiated
by Reagan (see also Philippon and Reshef, 2008). The rise was briey interrupted during the
S&L crisis, and reached a rst peak at the height of the dot-com bubble. Retracing somewhat
thereafter, the gap widened again during the recent housing and securitization boom. The
U.K. shows a similar pattern around the recent peaks in valuation. In contrast to the U.S.,
the wage gap in France and Germany have been relatively stable over the past two decades.
The left panel of Figure 7 shows the share of higher-educated workers (college equivalent)
who were employed by the nancial sector. The share has been sharply rising in the U.S.,
indicating that the nancial sector has increased demand for skills in the U.S. economy. In
the U.K. the picture is less clear. In France it rather has been receding over the past decades.
However, in Germany the share has been rising, too. The corresponding share of lower-educated
workers has been trending down both in the U.S., U.K., and France, yet in Germany it has
increased somewhat, too.
The development of nance/non-nance wage gaps and employment structures suggest that
nancial sector employees, especially with higher education, have been strongly beneting in
the era of deregulation and nancial booms in the U.S. In U.K. the picture is less clear, however
the wage premium in nance has rather increased over the past year. In France, there is no
evidence that the nancial sector has increased wages in nance and demand for skills, in line
with the rather stationary wage inequality over the past decades. In Germany, the evidence
20The relative wages are estimated with cross-section log weekly earnings regressions on the nancial sector
dummy, controlling for education, a quartic in experience, regions, sex and race, interactions between sex,
race, and experience. Given the di¤erences in data sets across countries, di¤erences in levels should not be
overemphasized, and the present analysis focuses on trends.
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Figure 5: Financial services trade balances ($ bn; IMF, International Financial Services, London)
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Figure 6: Finance/non-nance wage gaps (Wage regressions CPS, BHPS, GHS, SOEP, LFS)
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Figure 7: (a) Share of higher educated (college equivalent), and (b) share of lower educated
(less than college) working in the nancial sector (CPS, BHPS, SOEP, LFS)
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Figure 8: College/HS wage gaps (Wage regressions CPS, BHPS, GHS, SOEP, LFS)
is mixed. While nance dummies have come down somewhat, nancial sector employment of
skills has strongly increased, possibly putting upward pressure on wages of skilled individuals.
4.3 Overall wage and employment structure
Many studies have documented the rise in wage inequality in the U.S. and to some extent
in the U.K. since the 1980s (see Introduction). Figure 8 shows the college/high school wage
gap.21 In the U.S. the college/HS gap has increased substantially over time, although the
relative supply of educated workers has been increasing, as well, since the 1970s. In contrast
to the U.S., the development in France has been relatively at to decreasing. This pattern is
in line with other comparative studies on wage inequality (e.g. Piketty, 2007). In the U.K. the
trend is rather increasing. And in Germany, the college premium has stayed relatively at (in
line with earlier studies on German inequality, but in contrast to recent results of Dustmann,
Ludsteck, and Schönberg, 2009, who document a rising trend using new data).
Note the similarity between the development of the college/HS gap and the nance/non-
nance gap (compare Figure 6 and 8). Both gaps started to widen in the 1980s in the U.S.,
while they have been relatively stable in France over the past two decades. In the U.K. und
in Germany the trend is less clear.
Comparing the development of the college/HS gap and nancial booms / asset bubbles
yields a nal piece of suggestive evidence, by looking at (rough) indicators for extreme val-
uations of asset prices. Shiller (2000) introduced a very useful indicator for excessive stock
market valuations. Building on the analysis of Benjamin Graham and David Dodd, he cal-
21The relative wages are estimated with cross-section log weekly earnings regressions on the education dummies
using the same controls as for the estimation of the nance/non-nance wage gaps.
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Figure 9: 10-year U.S. historic price-earnings ratio and home price index (Homepage "Irrational
Exuberance" Shiller)
culates the price-earning ratio (PE ratio) of the S&P 500 using the 10-year moving average
of historical earnings to provide a rough indication for how far stock prices have decoupled
from fundamentals. Similarly, bubbles in housing can be approximated with a real house price
index, also calculated by Shiller.22 Figure 9 plots the two indicators from 1900 to 2009. One
can see that the S&P PE ratio reached a major peak during the stock market boom of 1929,
which has only been surpassed during the recent dot-com bubble. More importantly, after
having fallen during the 1970s, the measure started to rise in 1980s, and even after the burst
of the dot-com bubble remained high. Furthermore, the extreme stock valuations during the
dot-com bubble were subsequently replaced by a strong rise in home prices.
The comovements between college/HS wage gaps, nance wage gaps, measures of asset
bubbles, and the timing of nancial deregulation in the U.S. since the 1970s are striking. This
contrasts to France, which has not experienced a comparable boom in the nancial sector, and
whose wage structure has remained much more static. In the U.K. and Germany the trends are
less clear. The empirical ndings thus are suggestive evidence for our theoretical framework,
suggesting that asset bubbles and deregulation in the nancial sector starting in the Reagan
era have been important factors contributing to the rise in wage inequality in the U.S. and the
divergence from countries like France.
5 Conclusion
Modern nancial markets are characterized by high fees in nontraditional nancial products,
recurring phases of extreme valuations, and large rents to be earned in the nancial sector; and
that these features have played an important role in the recent developments of the wage struc-
22See http://www.irrationalexuberance.com/
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ture. This paper motivated and developed a theory where nancial institutions benet from
deregulation and extreme asset valuations, yet the complexity and novelty of fundamentals
surrounding asset bubbles and new nancial products favor the supremacy of skilled individu-
als in exploiting these opportunities. As a result, the emergence of asset bubbles increases the
opportunity set of skilled individuals in nancial intermediation, raising wage inequality and
nancial sector employment of skilled labor. The rise is reinforced by nancial deregulation,
and in an international context, countries with a comparative advantage in nancial interme-
diation experience a steeper rise. Furthermore, wages in nance may decouple from wages in
other sectors if insiders are able to protect rents in nancial intermediation from outsiders or
tastes in careers di¤er across individuals.
The main theoretical results can, in principle, also be interpreted in a more general context
of a "new economy" versus an "old economy". The di¢ culty to assess fundamentals and
measure marginal productivities in a growing new economy (such as dot-com, consulting, and
other more service oriented, less tangible sectors) creates increasing rent opportunities which
skilled individuals are more adept in exploiting. Hence, a growing number of skilled individuals
migrates from traditional to the new sectors, pushing up wages of skilled individuals.
An another aspect which the paper is silent about is the impact of the "brain drain" in the
real sector caused by the rents in the nancial sector on innovation and long-run growth in the
economy. The model in this paper could be extended to include an R&D sector generating new
capital goods which is skill-intensive. Periods of nancial booms would absorb R&D resources,
lowering technical progress, and thus would have a long-run impact on economic development.
The wage and employment patterns documented in the empirical part of the paper, al-
though not being conclusive proofs, are highly suggestive for our theoretical results. Finance/non-
nance wage gaps have been increasing in the U.S. und the U.K., which both beneted from
opportunities in global nance triggered by deregulations and extreme asset valuations. In
countries with smaller nancial sectors such as France and Germany, no such trends in nance
wage gaps can be discerned.
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Appendix
A. Welfare, dynamic e¢ ciency, and bubbles This exposition follows Blanchard and
Fischer (Lectures on Macroeconomics, 1989). Consider a central planner with a social welfare
function,
U = (1 + g) 1 ln(A0c2;0) +
X1
t=0
(1 + g)t [ln(Atc1;t) +  ln(At+1c2;t+1)] ;
weighing generations proportionally to technical progress, with c1;t and c2;t denoting consump-
tion per e¢ ciency units (lets abstract from skilled and unskilled for the moment). The resource
constraint on the planner is given by
Ntkt + yt = Nt+1(1 + g)kt+1 + c1;t + c2;t; with
yt = 
 1N t k

t (u  (L) 1Nt)(1  u)1  
First-order conditions with regards to c2;t, kt, and Nt, respectively, are
c2;t : 
1
c2;t
  (1 + g) 1
c1;t
= 0;
kt :   1
c1;t 1
Nt + (1 + g)
1
c1;t

Nt +
yt
kt

= 0;
Nt :   1
c1;t 1
kt + (1 + g)
1
c1;t

kt +
yt
Nt
  yt
Lu Nt

= 0;
The steady state is characterized by c1;t 1 = c1;t = c1. Not surprisingly, N, the optimum
range of goods intermediated, is larger that in the decentral equilibrium, cf. expression (11):
N =
(   1)uL
 + (   1) :
The economy is dynamically ine¢ cient if
k > k =
y
Ng
Lets compare this golden-rule to the condition under which bubbles may arise in the decentral
equilibrium,
k > k^ =
y^
N(g    + g ) :
Traditional nancial intermediation lowers the range of capital goods used by the real sector,
N < N, lowering output per variety, y=N . For a given N , markups in traditional intermedi-
ation, , lower the hurdle level. Hence, bubbles may arise although the economy appears to
be dynamically e¢ cient (using gross rates of return) if markups are high. On the other hand,
rents in bubble intermediation,  , raise the hurdle, making bubbles less likely to occur. Over-
all, bubbles may increase dynamic e¢ cienty, in line with the standard OLG model, however,
the resulting rent opportunities may lower e¢ ciency given the drain of skills in real production.
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B. Cycles of bubbles and inequality Consider two extensions to our basic framework.
First, the aggregate bubble might burst with an exogenous probability (1   q) next period.
Second, skilled individuals are able to create new bubbles. The extended framework generates
cycles of bubbles with elevated inequality.
Assume that the aggregate bubble might burst with exogenous probability (1 q), see Weil
(1987). Individual i chooses investments,

kit; b
i
t
	
, maximizing expected utility,
ln ci1;t + 

q ln ci2;b;t+1 + (1  q) ln ci2;nb;t+1
	
; subject to
ci1;t + k
i
t+1 + b
i
t  wit; ci2;b;t+1  (1 + rt+1)kit+1 + (1 + t+1)bit; and ci2;nb;t+1  (1 + rt+1)kit+1;
where the subscripts b and nb denote the state with bubbles intact and bubbles burst, respec-
tively, and 1 + t+1  (1    )Bt+1=Bt the growth factor of the bubble net of intermediation
fees. First-order conditions (FOCs) are
kit+1 :  
 
ci1;t
 1
+ (1 + rt+1)
n
q
 
ci2;b;t+1
 1
+ (1  q)  ci2;nb;t+1 1o = 0;
bit :  
 
ci1;t
 1
+ (1 + t+1)
n
q
 
ci2;b;t+1
 1o
= 0:
Using the FOCs one can show that the aggregate bubbles must grow according to the following
no-arbitrage condition:
1 + t+1 =
(1 + g)(1   )bt+1
bt
=
(1 + rt+1)N(1 + g)kt+1
qN(1 + g)kt+1   (1  q)bt ;
and that, additionally using budget constraints, the aggregate demand for capital and bubbles
per e¢ ciency units is given by
N(1 + g)kt+1 =
(1  q)(1 + t+1)
t+1   rt+1

1 + 
uwut + (1  u)wht
At
;
bt =
t+1   rt+1   (1  q)(1 + t+1)
t+1   rt+1

1 + 
uwut + (1  u)wht
At
;
The bubble cannot grow faster than the growth rate of the economy in the long run as there
would be a positive probability that the bubble outgrows the economy in nite time, limt!1(1+
t+1)  (1 + g). Given risk aversion, a bubbly equilibrium thus exists if and only if
q(1 + g)(1   ) > (1 + r^F =):
The expected growth factor of the bubble net of intermediation fees must be strictly larger
than the interest factor in the bubbleless steady-state. Hence bubbles cannot be too risky, see
Weil (1987).
Given conditions under which bubbles might arise, bubbles can be created by skilled workers
with technology
Bt = F (Bt 1;Kt)HBt ;
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with the function F : R2+ ! R+ being linearly homogeneous. A skilled individual can create
an intrinsically worthless paper asset with an initial value proportional to the existing size of
bubbles and capital in the economy. Imagine that like during the dot-com bubble era of the
late 1990s, university graduates can set up and sell new (e.g. internet-based) companies that
have never produced tangible revenues. Skilled individuals pursue these opportunities if the
payo¤s are greater than wages in real production (and intermediation of bubbles),
F

bt 1
1 + g
; kt

>
( bt=yt + (1    )) yt
(1  u)L :
In this case, aggregate bubbles (per e¢ ciency unit) grow according to
bt = F

bt 1
1 + g
; kt

hBt +
(1 + t)
(1 + g)(1   )bt 1;
as new bubbles are created each period, until bubble creation is no longer attractive, or the
aggregate bubble reaches the ceiling of the asymptotic bubbly path.23
Assume that the economy starts at t = 1 without bubbles, b0 = 0, conditions for bubbles
prevail, and bubble creation is su¢ ciently attractive,
F (0; k1) >
(1    ) y1
(1  u)L :
For example, deregulation could shift up the function F such that bubble creation becomes
attractive. Hence, wages of skilled individuals adjust upwards in order to equalize rewards
across bubble creation, bubble intermediation, and real production,
wht = F (Bt 1;Kt) =
 Bt
HFt
=
(1    )Yt
HYt
;
and labor markets clear, H = HBt + H
F
t + H
Y
t . Bubbles are created until it is no longer
attractive (before they reach the upper bound). Wage inequality remains at elevated levels
until the bubble bursts. Depending on the functional form of F , inequality retreats following
the crash, only to be rising again in the next phase of bubble creation.
In an economy characterized by high savings and low interest rates, there is a high demand
for new investment opportunities. Smart individuals might exploit this demand by creating
new investment opportunities, such as the latest dot-com start-up or CDO squared, especially
if opportunities in the "real economy" are not su¢ ciently attractive. In such an environment,
one bubble might chase the next, keeping wage inequality at elevated levels.
C. Data and construction
23Creation of bubbles in excess of the upper bound on the aggregate bubble would render all existing bubbles
worthless, and thus is not worthwile to pursue. However, one best assumes that bubble creation becomes
su¢ ciently di¢ cult before we reach the upper bound such that it becomes unattractive, in order to have a
well-dened equilibrium (with no incentives to deviate for single skilled individuals).
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Figure 10: Share of higher educated (college equivalent) in workforce (CPS, BHPS, GHS, SOEP,
LFS)
5.1 Data sources and construction
The wage and employment data comes from a variety of surveys such as the Current Population
Survey (CPS) in the U.S. Processing of the CPS data set will serve as benchmark, with data
from other countries processed as similarly as possible. See Appendix C for more details on
data and construction.
Note that quality of data and documentation varies across countries. After proper selection,
CPS and LFS (France) contain around 30000 or more observations for each year, whereas the
other countries have substantially less (around 5000 observations). Independently of data
issues, since systems of education vary substantially across countries, we focus on college
graduates versus lower educational achievements which is most similar across country (see
Figure 10). In wage regressions we use a similar granularity for controlling education across
countries.
U.S.: The March Current Population Survey is used, covering 1970-2008. The basic
processing closely follows Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008; see their data appendix): Samples
include wage/salary workers aged 16 to 64, working full-time (35+ hours), full-year (40+
weeks), not working in agriculture, public administration, or armed forces. Furthermore,
weekly earnings below 50% of minimum wage threshold are dropped. Top-coded earnings are
multiplied by 1.5 in line with Katz and Murphy (1992). CPS sampling weights are used. The
generation of educational dummies and potential experience follows Autor, Katz and Kearney.
Finally, the nancial sector dummy includes nance (including banking, savings institutions,
credit, securities, commodities, funds, trusts) and insurance. Patterns using hourly wages are
very similar to patterns using weekly wages (both calculated from annual wage information
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Figure 11: Share of workforce employed in nancial intermediation (Wage regressions CPS, BHPS,
GHS, SOEP, LFS)
using information on weeks and hours worked), hence weekly wages are used given substantial
number of missing values in hours worked.
U.K.: The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is used, covering 1991-2007, as well
as the General Household Survey (GHS), covering 1971-2006. We use two data sources since
the quality of BHPS data is higher, yet GHS has longer time series. Selection in both data
sets is similar to CPS. Hourly wages are used as patterns di¤er between weekly and hourly
wages in both data sets, and hourly wages correct for overtime. There are several gaps in GHS
due to missing industry classication. Generally, the industry classication of GHS needs to
be regarded with caution as classications changes in some years and old classication cannot
be readily translated into new classication (see Figure 11 which initially shows huge rise in
share of workforce employed in nancial sector which drops in 1996). For early years, a similar
fraction of the lowest wages are dropped as for CPS, and for later years (starting in 1999)
national minimum wages are used.
Germany: The Socioeconomic Household Panel is used, covering 1984-2008, focusing on
West Germany in line with other studies (e.g. Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg, 2009).
Selection is similar to CPS. Hourly wages are used. As no national minimum wage exists
(sector-specic minimum wages), a similar fraction of the lowest wages are dropped as for
CPS.
France: The Labor Force Survey (enquête emploi) is used, covering 1990-2007. Selection
is similar to CPS. Hourly wages are used. Full minimum wage used as cut-o¤ leading to similar
fraction of observations dropped as for CPS.
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